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In this paper we investigate how moral considerations, modelled as identity effects, 
affects an endogenous pollution permit trading equilibrium, in which governments 
choose in a non-cooperative way the amount of permits they allocate to their domestic 
industries. Politicians might feel reluctant to allow unlimited permit trading and/or 
may  prefer  that  abatement  is  undertaken  domestically  due  to  ethical  motivation. 
However, once governments have chosen permit allocations, firms trade these permits 
in an international competitive permit market without moral restraints. We show that 
governments’ moral concerns may actually increase global emissions but this result 
depends on the precise formulation of the identity function. Finally, we explore how 
exogenous technological change affects endogenous permit trading equilibria under 
identity considerations. We show that decreasing costs of abatement technologies may 
lead countries to overcome their reluctance to trading emission permits.  
 
Keywords: Tradeable emission permits, noncooperative game theory, moral 
motivation, identity, technological change. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we take a closer look at pollution permits when parties are reluctant to 
trade. Economists typically prefer trade in pollution permits over conventional, non 
market-based  environmental  policy  instruments  because  of  cost  efficiency 
considerations. Both in theory (see, e.g. Montgomery, 1972) and in practice (see, e.g. 
Schmalensee et al., 1998), market-based policy instruments are known to foster cost 
efficiency in environmental policy making. However, permit trade has been opposed 
by many observers such as environmental organisations and political parties. Some 
consider trade in pollution permits as a way to try to avoid one’s obligations, to pay 
others to clean up, or to pay indulgence, see Goodin (1994). In the Kyoto protocol for 
instance, trade in pollution permits is allowed, but only as a supplement to national 
mitigation.
4  This  mechanism  may  have  been  introduced  as  a  consequence  of  the 
majority of the signatories being reluctant to permit trading. Also in the European 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), access to buying emission reductions in third party 
countries (JI – Joint Implementation for economies in transition and CDM - Clean 
Development Mechanism for developing countries) can be limited by member states
5. 
Thus,  the  cost-effective  trade  volume  may  not  be  within  the  possibility  range. 
However, it seems to us that trading with pollution permits is more acceptable now 
than  it  was  just  10-15  years  back.  In  Norway  for  instance,  environmental 
organisations  are  now  trading  carbon  offsets  on  the  internet  (to  offset  carbon 
emissions from airline flights), even if they argued against pollution trade just a few 
years ago. 
We will study the implications in a tradable permit market if there are moral concerns 
against permit trading. Especially, we focus on a norm saying that one should not 
engage too much in permit trading and to do most of the abatement at home, but we 
assume that countries are willing to trade off the norm if the benefits from doing so 
are large enough. First, we study how moral concerns may affect global emissions. 
Second, we will try to come up with an explanation why there seems to be a larger 
interest in permit trade now compared to some years ago. A larger interest in pollution 
permit trade may be due to a change in the norm so that it is more acceptable than 
before.
6 But there may also be another explanation. Although there may continue to 
exist some reluctance to trade, the benefits from trade may be higher than before. This 
paper will focus on the latter explanation. If we compare the economy today and 10-
15  years  back,  one  striking  difference  is  the  change  in  mitigation  technology. 
Technology  improves  over  time,  in  such  a  way  that  mitigation  becomes  cheaper. 
Therefore, we want to study how improvements in mitigation technology may affect 
the market for pollution permits trade if there is a norm that you should not trade 
permits. In other words we will study how a change in technology will affect the 
benefits from trade, and if the benefits may be larger than the costs of trespassing the 
norm. 
                                                 
4 Article 6.1 of the original Kyoto Protocol text states “The acquisition of emission reduction units shall 
be  supplemental  to  domestic  actions  for  the  purposes  of  meeting  commitments  under  Article  3”. 
However, later meetings of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) have not been able to find a consensus 
on a more precise or quantitative meaning of this supplementarity requirement. 
5 More details on the latest proposed changes in the EU ETS 3
rd phase (2013-2020) can be found at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/35&format=HTML&aged=0&lan
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en. Although several scenarios are circulating (January 2008), it is clear that 
access to CDM and JI projects will not be unlimited.  
6  See, e.g., Nyborg and Rege (2003) for a study on changes in smoking norms.   3 
Some forms of moral concerns about permit trade, but not all as shown in this paper, 
represent additional costs of trading and thus give rise to lower welfare from trade 
compared to the case in which these concerns are absent. Thus, introducing these 
moral concerns shares similarities with a permit trade system with transaction costs
7, 
see, e.g., Stavins (1995). With transaction costs, the volume of trade is lower and 
welfare  is  lower  compared  to  a  system  without  transaction  costs.  Also  the  initial 
allocation of permits may affect the outcome of trading. However, the presence of 
moral considerations about permit trade is different than transaction costs in several 
respects, which will be outlined in more detail below.  
This paper is organised in the following way. We first discuss possible reasons behind 
the reluctance to trade pollution permits. In section 3, we present the model and derive 
conclusions on how identity considerations following from a norm against emission 
permit  trading,  change  governments’  behaviour  in  the  permit  trading  market. 
Section 4 studies how a change in technology affects the decisions for countries to 
involve in emissions trading. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Ethical reasoning, norms and identity 
In economic theory, it is assumed that most goods can be bought or sold in a market. 
However,  this  may  not  always  be  the  case  and  distaste,  or  even  repugnance,  for 
certain transactions may be a real constraint in many markets, see Roth (2008) for a 
survey.
8 This can be described as norms against trading certain goods. A norm is 
defined as a standard of right or wrong, and in all cultures there are goods that are 
considered to be “priceless” or “sacred” in such a way that we cannot set a price on 
them. Examples may be life, freedom, love, friendship, children, religion, democracy 
and the environment. Some of these goods are called taboo goods (Fiske and Tetlock, 
1997) where a taboo is defined as a particular powerful kind of normative prohibition. 
Taboos  are  meant  to  protect  individuals  and  societies  “from  behaviour  defined  or 
perceived to be dangerous” (Tannenwald, 1999), and breaking a taboo is usually met 
by  social  sanctions  or  repercussions.  Incommensurability  may  also  be  a  problem, 
meaning that there may not be a common measure to compare the goods (O’Neill, 
1993, chapter 7). Some examples may be friendship or love. A market may destroy 
these goods, as setting a price on them may reduce their value. However, there are 
goods that may be traded, not met by the same strength of sanctions while traded as 
taboo goods, but still there is a norm against such trade. Examples may be legalized 
prostitution, body organs and military duty (Bénabou and Tirole, 2007; Roth, 2008). 
Some kinds of transactions are considered repugnant in some times and places, but 
not in others, thus the boundaries between the secular and the sacred are evolving 
over time. For instance slavery is an example of a market that used to exist in large 
parts of the world, but is now repugnant and illegal in most places. On the other hand, 
there  has  been  more  positive  attitudes  over  time  towards  life  insurance  (Zeliner, 
1999), legalized prostitution and also pollution permits. 
Pollution permits has been recognised by several authors as a market where there may 
exist  some  reluctance  or  even  repugnance  against  transactions,  see,  e.g.,  Goodin 
                                                 
7 Roth (2008) compares repugnance to trade certain goods to a difficult technological barrier. 
8 Frank (1985), chapter 10, also gives several examples of why trade in certain goods should not be 
allowed.   4 
(1994), Bénabou and Tirole (2007) and Roth (2008). Why may there be reluctance or 
a norm against trade in certain goods such as pollution permits? 
In ethical reasoning, there are two ways to justify if an action is good or bad. The first 
is to refer to the consequences (teleology or substantive fairness). Based on this, an 
action is good if it is the best way to attain the aim we strive for (e.g, maximise 
welfare, reduce greenhouse gas emissions). Brekke et al. (2003) gives an example of 
moral reasoning based on teleology were people can pay an organisation instead of 
doing voluntary work. If they think that the payment is enough to pay professionals to 
do the job, they do not feel responsible anymore, and they may choose the market 
solution. But, if they think that the payment is not enough, they feel that they still are 
responsible for having the task done. 
However,  there  may  also  be  situations  where  we  dislike  giving  others  this 
responsibility,  independent  of  the  consequences  for  our  welfare.  This  leads  us  to 
another  way  of  moral  thinking  saying  that  consequences  alone  do  not  guide  us 
whether something is right or wrong (deontology or procedural fairness). It is not 
enough to know that the action is the most effective way to attain the aim. One can for 
instance argue that industrialised countries have created the global warming problem, 
and that is our duty to reduce the consequences of it by cleaning up our own backyard, 
even if this is not the way that minimises overall costs of taking action. This could 
also be used as an argument against selling permits by developing countries as selling 
quotas  to  industrialised  countries  would  not  lead  to  abatement  in  the  countries 
responsible  for  the  problem.  Another  argument  is  based  on  unfair  background 
conditions (see Kverndokk, 1995, and Eyckmans and Schokkaert, 2004). Even if two 
parties agree to trade permits, the trade may not be justified on ethical reasons. A 
voluntary  agreement  between  two  parties  is  not  necessary  fair  if  is  entered  into 
conditions that are not fair (Pogge, 1989). Background justice is not preserved when 
some  participant’s  basic  rights,  opportunities  or  economic  positions  are  grossly 
inferior. Under the Kyoto Protocol, for instance, one may argue that this is the case 
for some CDM contracts. 
Economics is basically about consequences. If the consequences of the use of a policy 
instrument is positive (increasing welfare), we recommend it. This is the case with 
emission  permits.  The  basic  argument  of  quota  trade  is  that  it  is  cost-effective 
(Montgomery, 1972), thus parties involved in permit trade would get lower abatement 
costs than if they had to mitigate the emissions within their geographical boundaries. 
Thus, cost-savings will be welfare improving, everything else given. One possible 
explanation of the resistance of permit trade is therefore, that welfare improvements 
following  from  permit  trade  have  not  been  communicated  well  enough,  i.e.,  the 
standpoint is based on lack of information.
9  
However,  other  explanations  may  also  be  plausible.  There  may  be  negative 
consequences of a permit market, consequences that may be related to the aim of 
preserving the global environment, or it may be related more broadly to other areas of 
the  society  concerning,  e.g.,  responsibility.  Buying,  via  the  CDM  mechanism, 
greenhouse gasses pollution permits in countries that did not subscribe to binding 
emission limits in the Kyoto Protocol, may have some adverse effects based on lack 
                                                 
9 One example based on lack of information pointed out to us by Alistair Ulph is as follows. If a 
country has extremely high marginal abatement costs (in the limit infinite: i.e., it cannot abate) then 
wanting to do all the abatement at home is just not sensible (ethically); it would seem more appropriate, 
for a country to use its resources to pay a country which can abate cheaply to do so.   5 
of  an  emission  baseline,  moral  hazard,  lack  of  incentives  to  undertake  emissions 
reductions by the developing countries, transaction costs and carbon leakages. There 
is  also  some  discussion  whether  CDM’s  have  the  expected  effect  on  emission 
reductions  as  some  observers  argue  that  the  market  is  flooded  by  projects  of 
questionable quality (Harvey, 2006, and Davies, 2007). Hot air, meaning that some 
countries get initial emission quotas that are higher than their actual emissions, has 
also been mentioned as a reason to avoid emission trading as trading hot air will not 
reduce  emissions.  Other  arguments  that  have  been  raised  in  this  debate  are  the 
positive spillover effects of technology development by national abatement as well as 
the ancillary benefits (reduction in local emissions, traffic accidents, congestion etc.) 
of abating at home. 
Abating at home instead of buying emission permits, shares some similarities with 
unilateral  actions  taken  by  a  country.  Unilateral  actions  may  be  defended  as  a 
contribution in the right direction or as setting a good example. Hoel (1991) analyses 
effects of unilateral actions on harmful emissions, and concludes that in absence of a 
negotiated agreement, such a policy will typically lead to lower aggregated emissions 
than a selfish policy. But this policy may also affect the outcome of negotiations on 
emission reductions. Hoel concludes that the outcome may very well imply higher 
total emissions. However, if the unilateral action is announced as a commitment to 
reduce emissions in excess of the outcome of the negotiation, total emissions will 
likely be lower than only compared to the case where all countries act selfishly. Some 
arguments not analysed by Hoel and which may be in favour of unilateral action are 
that the action may lead to similar behaviour by other countries, it may affect the 
climate in international agreement positively, and it may reduce the conflict of interest 
within a country as it actually shows the true costs of abatement. 
The  discussion  above  provides  arguments,  based  on  both  procedural  fairness  and 
consequentialist ethics, against permit trading. We will summarize this discussion by 
reducing it to two basic statements that we will formalize in our model: 1) countries 
might dislike permit trading, and 2) countries might prefer to do all the abatement at 
home. The first statement is weaker than the second as this does not necessary mean 
that countries care about the environment. However, reasons to avoid trading are often 
based on a preference for environmental values, and in the second claim, the major 
motivation is to save the environment, and to do that independent of international 
agreements and quota trade. We do not claim that these statements are true or that 
there are good ethical arguments against permit trading. However, we think that these 
statements may describe some of the reluctance that we observe in the political debate 
on permit trading. 
The statements above may form a norm against trading pollution permits. Norms are 
closely related to the preservation of identity, and by modelling a norm against permit 
trade, we build on the theory of identity and moral motivation (Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000, 2005; Brekke, et al., 2003). In this way we can model both the reluctance to 
trade with pollution permits, and given that the agent does not follow the norm, the 
wish to reduce the trade even if it is economically profitable.
10 As the reasons for 
trade reluctance may be based on both procedural fairness as well as consequences, 
we do not try to endogenise the norm in the model, meaning that we do not determine 
why a society chooses a certain norm against trade. 
                                                 
10  An  example  of  the  last  property  can  for  instance  be  the  supplementary  condition  in  the  Kyoto 
Protocol where the parties agreed that permit trade should only be a supplement to national abatement.   6 
 
 
3.  The permit trade model 
Our  framework  is  based  on  Helm  (2003)  who  presented a  model  of  international 
emissions trading in which countries choose the amount of permits they allocate to 
their  domestic  industry  in  an  endogenous  and  non-cooperative  way.  We  expand 
Helm’s model by introducing explicit identity considerations. Countries are assumed 
to be reluctant to trade (large quantities of) emissions permits and/or may dislike the 
fact that they emit more than what they ideally think that they should do. 
The model works in the following way. There are n countries or governments engaged 
in  negotiations  on  a  future  international  environmental  agreement  including 
provisions for pollution permit trading. The governments represent the view of the 
voters who are, to some extent, reluctant to trade permits. However, they are willing 
to trade if the benefits from trade are large enough. As in Helm (2003), we make the 
assumption that the permit trading regime is established only by unanimous approval 
of  all  countries.  Allowing  for  endogenous  coalition  formation  would  substantially 
complicate the analysis as the countries are not symmetric in our analysis. Rather the 
difference between countries is essential here.
11 However, in section 4 we will study 
the decision to enter the trading club and how this is affected by technological change. 
In the first stage, governments choose in a non-cooperative way their initial emissions 
allocation. Note that this setup resembles closely the reality of international climate 
negotiations, in particular in the run up to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and in the coming 
negotiations on a follow up agreement for the post-Kyoto period. Another example is 
the EUs emission trading system (ETS) in the periods 2005-2007 (i.e., before the start 
up  of  the  global  Kyoto  permit  market  period)  and  2008-2012  (i.e.,  the  first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol). EU member states had to draft National 
Allocation Plans (NAPs) suggesting a permit allocation for all installation covered by 
the ETS directive on their territory.  
In the last stage of the game, individual firms trade emissions in a competitive permit 
market. They have no other option than to obey the emission ceiling and they do not 
have any other goal than maximizing profit. Thus, we assume that firms do not have 
moral concerns about trading.
12 
This game is solved by backwards induction, i.e., we start be solving the last stage 
first. 
 
3.1 STAGE 2: Firms trading emissions 
We  assume  that  in  every  country  1 2 ∈ = … i N { , , ,n}  there  is  a  large  number  of 
identical firms that maximizes profits taking as given the emissions trading scheme: 
                                                 
11 Symmetric or homogeneous countries is a common assumption in studies of coalition formation, see, 
e.g., Barrett (2005). 
12 This is consistent with Siebert (1992, p. 130) and Rauscher (2006) who argue that a firm spending 
resources on social activities not rewarded by the market will not remain competitive and will be 
driven out of the market. However, if firms have market power, non-profit motives can survive.   7 
  ( ) ( ) [ ] max ; , , ;
i
i i i i i i i e
e p B e p e π ω β β ω = + −   (1) 
The benefits of emissions,  i B , can be interpreted as a production function. Producing 
value  added  requires,  among  others,  input  of  carbon  emissions.  The  benefit  of 
emissions function is assumed strictly increasing and strictly concave in emissions: 
0
e
i B >  and  0
ee
i B < . Benefits are depending also on a technology shift parameter  β  
in  such  a  way  that 0  and   0
e
i i B B
β β < < ,  hence  marginal  benefits  of  emissions 
decrease  in  the  technology  parameter  β   and,  therefore,  an  increase  in  β   can  be 
interpreted  as  an  efficiency  improvement  or  a  reduction  of  marginal  emission 
abatement costs. Note that the technology parameter is not country specific, thus we 
assume that there are technology spillovers between countries.  In Appendix 1, the 
properties of the benefit function are derived. 
From the first-order condition for profit maximization, we can derive the demand for 
emissions:
 13 
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Profit maximizing behaviour by firms leads to cost-effectiveness: marginal benefits of 
emissions are equalised across firms. Thus, this condition is valid even if countries 
have moral arguments against permit trading, as such considerations are not taken into 
account by the competitive firms. This would not have been the case with transaction 
costs related to the volume of trade (Stavins, 1995). 
Comparative statics of this expressions shows that emissions are decreasing in the 
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We denote by  0 i ω ≥  the initial allocation of permits to firm i. Using (2), we can 
define a “net supply of permits” function that is increasing in the price of permits and 
in the technology parameter: 
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13 We assume that benefits of emissions are such that an interior solution to the firm’s maximization 
problem always exists. In particular, we assume that  ( ) 0 lim ,
i
e
e i i B e β → = +∞  and that, in the complete 
absence of environmental considerations, there exists an emission level  0 > i e  defined by the condition 
( ) , 0 β =
e
i i B e .   8 
A pollution permit market equilibrium is defined as a price level such that total net 
supply of permits is nonnegative: 
  ( ) ( ) such that ; ; 0
o o o
j j j
j N j N
p S p E p β ω β
∈ ∈
  = − ≥   ∑ ∑   (5) 
This  market  equilibrium  condition  implicitly  defines  a  price  function  mapping  a 
vector of emission allocations ω into the market clearing price level:  ( ) ,
o p ρ β = ω . 
We  assume  that  the  marginal  benefit  functions  are  such  that  for  every  vector  of 
emission  allocations,  there  exists  a  unique  equilibrium  permit  price
14.  The  permit 
price function can be shown to be decreasing in the initial allocations of permits to a 
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Hence, corresponding to intuition, higher allocations of permits and lower marginal 
emission abatement costs lead to a decrease in the equilibrium permit price. 
 
3.2 STAGE 1: Governments choosing initial permit allocations 
Given the smoothly working permit market in stage 2, governments negotiate on the 
initial allocation of permits and we assume that they choose a number of permits  i ω  
as to maximize the following welfare function: 
  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) , ; , ; , , ;
S
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i W e B e p e D I e e ω ω β β ω ω ω ω β − − = + − − + +   (7) 
The function  i D  denotes pollution damages incurred by country i. These damages are 
convex  in  global  emissions,  which  is  defined  by  the  total  amount  of  permits 
distributed (country i’s permits are  i ω , while all other countries’ emission permits are 
i ω− ). Thus, the environmental problem is caused by a uniformly mixing pollutant as 
in  the  case  of  global  climate  change.  We  assume  that  country i  maximizes  its 
emissions, taking as given the permit allocations by all other countries ( i i ω ω − − = ). 
Hence, we are looking for a Nash equilibrium among national governments in permit 
allocations. 
This set-up is similar to the model introduced by Helm (2003). However, in addition 
to the approach by Helm, we assume that countries experience an identity effect of 
their emission and permit trading behaviour, Ii, which adds positively to there welfare 
function. Identity is usually defined as a person’s self image – as an individual or as a 
part  of  a  group  (Akerlof  and  Kranton,  2003).  Identity  has  been  recognised  as 
                                                 
14  If  more  permits  would  be  allocated  than  the  net  demand  for  emissions,  we  assume  that  the 
equilibrium price is zero:  ( ) 0; 0
o
j j
j N j N
E p ω β
∈ ∈
> ⇒ = ∑ ∑ .   9 
important for individual behaviour in fields as social psychology and sociology, but 
has only recently been adopted in formal economic models. In this paper, however, 
we define a country’s identity in the same way as the identity of an individual. This is 
justified by assuming that governments perform the moral reasoning of its voters. If a 
substantial share of voters has moral reflections on pollution permit trading, this will 
be reflected in the government’s decision if ruling politicians care about their re-
election chances.  
Based on the statements made in section 2, the identity of a country is a function of 
it’s actual emissions,  i e , it’s permit allowances ωi as well as it’s ideal emissions, 
S
i e . 
The latter is defined as the emission level that the country would like to aim for based 
on ethical reasoning. This ideal is considered exogenous. The precise way this ideal is 
determined, will be discussed later in the paper. 
Using the notation introduced before, we can write the objective of the government of 
country i, taking into account competitive permit trading by firms in stage two, as: 
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  (8) 
Each country then wants to set its initial permit allocation, ωi, in order to maximise 
welfare. The first-order condition for an interior solution is therefore (all variables and 
functions are evaluated in the Nash equilibrium of permit allocations), where  ∆ i I  is 
the change in identity for a change in ωi: 
  [ ] 1 0
e p p e
i i i i i i i B E E E D I
ω ω ω ρ ρ ω ρ ρ   + − + − − +∆ =     (9) 
Or, after simplifying (using the first-order condition 
e
i B ρ =  of competitive permit 
trading among firms in stage 2), the following condition should be satisfied for all 
countries  ∈ i N : 
  [ ] 0
e
i i i i E D I
ω ρ ω ρ − + − +∆ =   (10) 
The first term on the left hand side (LHS) stands for the effect of additional permit 
allocations on the emission trading revenue through the effect on the permit price. A 
more generous permit allocation is beneficial for permit importers (as the market price 
at which they sell goes down), a more restricted permit allocation is beneficial for 
permit exporters (as the market price at which they buy goes up). We will label this 
effect the strategic permit trading effect. 
The second term is the direct price effect of a more generous permit allocation. Every 
additional permit is worth the prevailing market price ρ . The third term stands for the 
additional pollution damage effect caused by a more generous permit allocation. More 
permits lead, ceteris paribus, to higher global emissions and hence higher pollution 
damages. This effect is therefore negative. Finally, the last term captures the change 
in identity of extra permits. This effect can be positive or negative depending upon the 
precise specification of the identity function. We will first derive results for a general 
formulation of the identity effect before turning to more precise specifications of the 
identity functions.   10 
Rearranging (10) and using again the firms’ profit maximizing first-order condition 
e
i B ρ = , we obtain: 
  [ ]
e e
i i i i i B D E I
ω ρ ω = − − −∆   (11) 
Hence,  every  country  chooses  an  initial  permit  allocation  such  that  its  marginal 
benefit from the last ton of emissions equals individual marginal damages, corrected 
for a strategic permit trade effect and an identity effect. In the following paragraph we 
will first study the endogenous permit allocation equilibrium ignoring identity effects. 
We will then turn to introducing identity considerations. 
As a reference point, we can also easily find the standard non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium in emissions when firms do not trade. Setting  i i E ω =  in equation (11), 
we find: 
  ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) = −∆
e e
i i i N i B e D e I   (12) 




= ∑ . 
3.2.1 If identity does not matter 
If  identity  does  not  matter  (i.e.,  0 i I ∆ = ),  the  model  boils  down  to  a  strategic 
emissions trading model. Hahn (1984) was one of the first describing non-competitive 
behaviour  in  emissions  permit  markets  but  one  important  difference  between  our 
approach and Hahn’s model is that we do not start from an exogenously fixed total 
amount of permits in the market. We follow Helm (2003) who was the first to study 
the implications of endogenously determined permit allocations in an international 
permit market model. Although both in Helm’s and our model, firms are assumed to 
be price takers on the permit market, their national governments act strategically on 
their behalf when deciding on the total amount of permits it will allocation to its 
domestic industries. 
If  0 i I ∆ = , equation (10) is reduced to: 
  [ ]
e
i i i E D
ω ρ ρ ω + − =   (13) 
In  the  strategic  emission  trading  model,  intuitively,  net  permit  selling  countries 
( 0 i i E ω − > ) tend to under allocate their domestic firms as this makes permits scarce 
and drives up the equilibrium market price (recall that  0
ω ρ < ). On the other hand, net 
permit buying countries tend to over allocate their domestic firms because this makes 
permits more abundant and lowers the market price. As shown by Helm (2003), the 
net effect on global emissions cannot be signed in general since it depends on the 
relative weight of permit exporters versus importers. This is stated more formally in 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 (Proposition 2 in Helm, 2003): 
If identity considerations do not matter (i.e.,  0 i I ∆ = ), the overall amount of emissions 
permits issued in the endogenous permit allocation equilibrium might be higher or 
lower then in the Nash equilibrium without trading. In particular:   11 
  ( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ
o o e o e
N j j N j j j j
j N j N j N j N
e e B E B e ω ω
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= = ⇔ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ￿ ￿   (14) 
Proof: Setting  0 i I ∆ =  and using the first-order conditions in (11) and (12), convexity 
of damage and concavity of benefit functions, it follows: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ
o e o e e o o o e
N N i N i N i i i i i i e D D e B E E B e
ω ω ω ρ ω   ⇔ ⇔ + −   ￿ ￿ ￿    
where  ( ) ( ) ; ;
o o
i i E E ρ β β = ω   denotes  the  equilibrium  emission  level  for  permit 
allocation  vector 
o ω ,  when  identity  is  not  taken  into  account.  Summing  over  all 
countries  and  using  the  permit  market  clearing  condition  yields  the  desired  result 
in (14). 
Q.E.D. 
If damages from global emissions were linear, then the result becomes more clear cut. 
The  total  amount  of  emissions  is  the  same  and  every  permit  importer  (exporter) 
allocates less (more) in the endogenous permit allocation equilibrium compared to the 
non-cooperative Nash emissions equilibrium without permit trade.  
Corollary 1 
If  damages  of  global  emissions  are  linear  ( ( ) 0
e
i i D x d x = ∀ ≥ )  and  if  identity 
considerations do not matter (i.e.,  0 i I ∆ = ), the overall amount of emissions permits 
issued in the endogenous permit allocation equilibrium is equal to the global amount 
of emissions in the Nash equilibrium without trading. Moreover, permit importers 
(exporters)  allocate  less  (more)  in  the  endogenous  permit  allocation  equilibrium 
compared to the non-cooperative Nash emissions equilibrium without permit trade. 
The proof of this corollary follows trivially from the first-order conditions (11) and 
(12). 
However, it can in general be shown that the total amount of permits issued in the 
endogenous permit allocation equilibrium will always exceed the first-best optimal 
amount of permits. The first-best allocation of emissions, 
*
i e , results from maximizing 
a utilitarian social welfare function and can be characterized by the Samuelson rule 
(see for instance Eyckmans et al., 1993): 
  ( ) ( )
* * e e
i i j N
j N
B e D e i N
∈
= ∀ ∈ ∑   (15) 
Proposition 2: 
If identity considerations do not matter (i.e.,  0 i I ∆ = ), the global amount of emissions 
permits issued in the endogenous permit allocation equilibrium is higher than the first 
best amount of emissions.    12 






≤ ≡ ∑ . Using the first-order conditions 
of the endogenous permit allocation equilibrium (10) and the first-best allocation of 
emissions,
e
i B ρ = , it follows that: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * e o o o e o e e
i i j N j N i i
j N j N
B E n D D e B e ρ ρ ω
∈ ∈
= < = ≤ = ∑ ∑   for  all  i N ∈ .  Because  of 
concavity  of  the  benefit  function,  it  follows  that 
* o
i i E e i N > ∀ ∈   and  hence 
* o
i N j
j N j N
E e ω
∈ ∈
= > ∑ ∑ which contradicts the initial assumption. 
Q.E.D. 
Although  the  endogenous  permit  allocation  equilibrium  can  lead  to  more  or  less 
emissions  compared  to  the  standard  Nash  equilibrium  without  trading  (see 
Proposition 1),  we  know  for  sure  that  the  permit  trading  equilibrium  is  globally 
inefficient.  Global  emissions  are  too  high  or,  equivalently,  too  little  abatement  is 
undertaken.  
3.2.2 If identity matters 
How does the introduction of identity considerations alter the results reported so far? 
Clearly,  the  distortions  caused  by  introducing  identity  considerations  will  depend 
upon the precise specification of the identity function.  
We will consider two main factors determining identity based on the statements in 
section 2: Countries might dislike permit trading, and countries might prefer to do all 
the abatement at home. However, for ease of exposition, we will start by studying the 
two statements separately before combining both arguments. 
3.2.2.1 Reluctance to trade 
We start by studying the statement that countries dislike permit trading. Assume first 
a symmetric formulation of reluctance to trade, i.e., countries dislike both selling and 
buying permits: 





i i i i i
i i i
F E if E
I e
otherwise
δ ω ρ β β ω ρ β
ω β
   − − − ≠    = 
 
ω ω
  (16) 
Involving in permit trading represents a cost, both for buyers and sellers, due to the 
fact that one does not act in accordance with one’s moral conviction. This loss in 
identity consists of a fixed cost, Fi, independent of the amount of permits traded, and 
a  variable  cost.  The  fixed  cost  represents  the  loss  of  going  from  one  regime  to 
another,  here  represented  by  going  from  a  non-trade  regime  to  a  trading  regime. 
However, the volume of trade also matters. If a country decides to trade, it feels less 
comfortable the higher the volume of permit trading is as long as δ > 0.
15 An example 
of the last property can for instance be the supplementary condition in the Kyoto 
Protocol as well as recent political discussions, e.g., in Norway, on setting a limit on 
how much one can reduce abatement abroad. This identity function only takes into 
                                                 
15 In the case where 0 δ = , i.e., there is an identity cost of not following the norm, which is independent 
on the volume of trade as long as the volume is positive, we will actually get the same first order 
conditions as when identity does not matter, i.e.,  0 i I ∆ = .   13 
account pollution permit transactions, and not explicitly the national abatement level. 
Identity from national abatement will be studied in detail below. Finally, note that this 
identity function has a maximum at zero in the absence of emissions trading. 
The discussion on the acceptability of permit trading is mainly a topic in countries 
that  are  potential  permit  buyers.  We  will,  therefore,  also  consider  a  case  with  an 
asymmetric identity function, where countries only suffer an extra identity loss if they 
buy emissions:  
( )





i i i i i
i i i i i i
F E if E
I e F if E
otherwise
δ ω ρ β β ω ρ β
ω β ω




           (17) 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, these identity considerations, both the fixed and the 
variable term represent costs of trading and thus lower welfare in the trading system 
compared  to  when  identity  considerations  are  not  present.  Thus,  this  shares 
similarities with a permit trade system with transaction costs as in Stavins (1995). 
With transaction costs, the volume of trade is lower and welfare is lower compared to 
a system without transaction costs. Also the initial allocation of permits may affect the 
outcome of trading. 
However, moral considerations affect permit trading differently than transaction costs 
in  several  respects.  First,  the  fixed  identity  term  affects  the  decision  whether  the 
country wants to take part in the permit trading market (see section 4 below), and 
second, the endogenous part of the identity function affects the allocation of initial 
allowances as countries do not want the allowance allocations to be very different 
from actual emissions. This means that the volume of trade will be lower. However, 
for a given level of aggregated allowances (global emissions target), the outcome of 
trading is not affected by the initial allowance allocation. In our model, firms face no 
transaction costs in trade so they trade cost-effectively, i.e., marginal abatement costs 
among sources are equal (see stage 2 above). This is not the case in models with 
transaction costs as these costs are modelled as a function of the volume of trade. 
Using this explicit identity function, we can derive the following result: 
Proposition 3: 
If countries are reluctant to trade permits, and if identity is symmetric it can be shown 
that: 
•  if country i is a permit seller ( i i E ω > ) it follows that 
e e
i i B D > ; 
•  if country i is a permit buyer ( i i E ω < ) it follows that 
e e
i i B D < . 
Proof: The change in the identity effect in first-order condition (11) from a marginal 
increase in the initial permit allowance  i ω  is given by:  [ ] 2 1
p
i i i i I E E
ω δ ρ ω   ∆ = − − −   . 
This  change  is  positive  for  permit  buyers  and  negative  for  permit  sellers  for  the 







≤ = ≤ ∑ . Therefore, it follows 
that:   14 
 




  − = − − + − −  
    = − − + −    
+
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
e e p
i i i i i i i
p
i i i




ρ ω δ ρ ω
ω ρ δ ρ    
and therefore 
e e
i i B D ￿  if  i i E ω ￿ . 
Q.E.D. 
The intuition is as follows. Net permit selling countries tend to under allocate their 
domestic firms as this makes permits scarce and drives up the equilibrium market 
price. In addition, the under allocation has positive identity effects as the volume of 
trade goes down, or in other words, the gap between permit allocation and actual 
emissions  shrinks.  On  the  other  hand,  net  permit  buying  countries  tend  to  over 
allocate their domestic firms because this makes permits more abundant and lowers 
the market price. Further, the same identity mechanism as described for sellers is also 
valid for buyers; over allocating permits has positive identity effects as the volume of 
trade goes down. Summarizing, the identity effect, if it only stems from reluctance to 
trade, confirms the results obtained by Helm (2003). The identity effect reinforces the 
strategic trade incentives for both sellers and buyers of permits. 
How  does  the  introduction  of  identity  considerations  affect  the  global  amount  of 
permits issued into the market? In order to find the global effect, we take the sum over 
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j j j j
j N j N
n D E E
ω ρ δρ ω
∈ ∈
  = − −   ∑ ∑   (18) 
As  the  following  results  show,  the  outcome  depends  on  the  “balance  of  power” 
between permit exporters and importers. 
Proposition 4: 






  − > <   ∑ , 
global emissions will be lower (higher) and every country will emit less (more) than 
in the endogenous permit allocation equilibrium without identity considerations.  






  − >   ∑   and 
I o
N N ω ω > ,  i.e., 
global emissions are higher with the introduction of the identity function. Because of 
convexity of the damage functions if follows that:  ( ) ( )
e I e o
j N j N
j N j N
D D ω ω
∈ ∈
> ∑ ∑ . Using   15 






















  + − >  
⇓




   
Hence, the equilibrium permit price with identity considerations would be higher than 
the price without. Given that the equilibrium price function is decreasing in the global 
permit allocation, this would imply 
I o
N N ω ω <  which contradicts the initial assumption. 






  − >   ∑ , it follows that the global 
emissions will be lower and, hence, equilibrium price of permits will be higher in case 
of identity considerations and therefore, every country’s representative firm will emit 
less:  ( ) ( )
e I I o e o I o
i i i i i i B E B E E E ρ ρ = > = ⇒ <   due  to  concavity  of  the  benefit 
functions. 
Q.E.D. 






  − >   ∑ ,  reluctance  to  trade  shifts  the  endogenous  permit 
allocation equilibrium in the direction of the first-best Pareto efficient solution but we 
cannot tell whether we will fall short or overshoot the efficient solution. But how 






  − >   ∑ ? This sum can be interpreted as 
a weighted average of all the permit trades (positive and negative) where the weights 
are given by the inverse of the slope of the marginal benefit of emissions function 
(recall  that  1 0
p ee






  −   ∑   to  be 
positive, permit exporters should, on average, have higher values of 
p
i E  than permit 
importers.  Note  that  high  absolute  values  of 
ee
i B   (i.e.,  steep  marginal  emission 
abatement cost functions) imply high values (i.e., small negative numbers) of 
p
i E . 
Therefore, the term is positive if permit sellers are predominantly countries with steep 
marginal abatement cost functions.  
Note that this is not very likely to  apply to the Kyoto permit market  in the first 
commitment  period  2008-2012.  Most  empirical  carbon  emission  market  models 
predict  on  the  contrary  that  it  are  especially  low  abatement  cost  countries  (i.e., 
countries with flat marginal benefit functions 
e
i B ) that will export carbon emissions 
permits, see Böhringer  (2002), Den Elzen  and  de Moor  (2002) or Eyckmans and 
Hagem (2008). Therefore, in the case of the Kyoto permit markets, it is more likely 
that  identity  considerations  would  shift  endogenous  permit  allocation  equilibrium 
away  from  the  efficient  solution.  This  means  that  the  solution  with  identity 
considerations might be less efficient than without those considerations. 
   16 
Proposition 5: 
If  only  buyers  are  reluctant  to  trade  (asymmetric  identity  function (17)),  then  the 
endogenous permit allocation equilibrium is shifted further away from the efficient 
solution and every individual country will emit more than in the endogenous permit 
allocation equilibrium without identity considerations. 
Proof: The first-order conditions for governments issuing permits are different for 
permit importers ( i i E ω < ) and exporters ( i i E ω ≥ ): 






ρ ω δ ρ ω ω
ρ ω ω
   − + − − − − = <   

− + − = ≥  
e e p
i i i i i i i i i
e e
i i i i i i
B D E E E if E
B D E if E
   
Summing over both types of countries and using the market clearing condition from 
(5), it follows that:  
  { } 2 min 0, 1 0
ω δ ω ρ
∈ ∈ ∈
  − − − − =   ∑ ∑ ∑
e e p
j j j j j
j N j N j N
B D E E    
The minimum function  { } min 0, j j E ω −  allows us to sum over all countries while 
taking into account the identity effect for permit importers only.  
Assuming, in contrast to the claim in Proposition 5, 
I o
N N ω ω <  and using convexity of 
the damage functions if follows that:  ( ) ( )
e I e o
j N j N
j N j N
D D ω ω
∈ ∈
< ∑ ∑ . Using the appropriate 




ω ρ   ≤ − ≤   ):  
  { }
2







ρ ρ ω ρ
∈
  − < − − <   ∑    
Hence,  the  equilibrium  permit  price  would  be  lower  with  asymmetric  identity 
considerations than without. Given that the equilibrium price function is decreasing in 
the global permit allocation, this would imply 
I o
N N ω ω >  which contradicts the initial 
assumption.  Therefore,  it  must  be  that 
I o
N N ω ω ≥ ,  i.e.,  taking  into  account  identity 
considerations  will  lead  to  higher  global  emissions  than  without  identity 
considerations, and therefore, the total emissions are shifted further away from the 
first best level of global emissions. 
As we have just shown that the equilibrium price of permits will be lower in case of 
asymmetric identity considerations, it follows that every country’s representative firm 
will emit more:  ( ) ( )
e I I o e o I o
i i i i i i B E B E E E ρ ρ = < = ⇒ >  due to concavity of the 
benefit functions. 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 5 is intuitively clear. We know that permit buyers have an incentive to 
over allocate their domestic industries because of (1) strategic trade considerations 
(i.e. for driving down the equilibrium permit price), and (2) identity considerations 
(i.e.  over  allocating  domestic  firms  reduces  the  amount  of  permits  that  has  to  be 
imported). Since only buyers’ identity considerations are taken into account in the   17 
asymmetric identity function (17), it obviously follows that global emissions will be 
higher than in the scenario without identity considerations.  
3.2.2.2 Gap between actual and ideal effort level 
Reluctance to trade is one aspect of a country’s identity, but the country could also 
care about its actual level of emissions. To model this, we assume that identity also 
depends on the relationship between actual emissions and the morally ideal emissions, 
e
S. Following Brekke et al. (2003) we assume that the ideal emissions are found by 
maximizing a utilitarian welfare function where everybody follows the same general 
rule, namely emit the amount that maximizes the utilitarian welfare function. Thus 
this gives 
* S
i i e e = , where 
*
i e follows from (15). Note also that 
*
i e is only a function of 
β, and is therefore considered exogenous in all analysis we perform apart from in 
section 4 where we consider a change in β. This new identity function can be 
specified in the following way: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 * * , ; , ; i i i i i I e e E e β γ ρ β β   = − −   ω   (19) 
First of all, we show that every country will emit more than what is considered as the 
“ideal” emissions level, i.e., the first-best Pareto efficient emissions allocation. 
Proposition 6: 
If countries care only about the ideal, every individual country will emit more than its 
first-best emissions level:  ≥
*
i i E e  and therefore, total amount of permits allocated will 
exceed the first-best level ω ≥
*
N N e . 
Proof: Assume, on the contrary, that  ∃ ∈ <
*
i i i N : E e . From the strict concavity of 
the emissions benefit function, it follows that  ( ) ( ) >
e e *
i i i i B E B e . Using the appropriate 
first-order conditions, (2) and (15), this implies: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * ρ ω ρ ω
∈
= > = = ⇒ < ∑
e e e
N i i i i j N N N N
j N
B E B e D e e e    
At the same time, we can derive: 
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D D D D e E e E
e
   
Which contradicts the previously established inequality. We can therefore conclude 
that ∀ ∈ ≥
*
i i i N : E e . 
Given that every country emits more than the ideal level, it follows obviously that 
total emissions in the endogenous permit allocation equilibrium will exceed the first-
best level: 
* ω > N N e .   18 
Q.E.D. 
Given that we now know from Proposition 6 that every country always emits more 





i i i i I E e E
ω γρ   ∆ = − − <     (20) 
Taken in isolation, the identity effect that refers to the ideal effort level shifts the 
endogenous  permit  allocation  equilibrium  towards  the  Pareto  efficient  first-best 
allocation of emissions.  
Proposition 7: 
If  countries  care  only  about  the  ideal,  then  the  endogenous  permit  allocation 
equilibrium is shifted in the direction of the efficient solution and every individual 
country will emit less than in the endogenous permit allocation equilibrium without 
identity considerations. 
Proof: Assuming, in contrast, that 
I o
N N ω ω >  if countries care about the ideal. Using 
convexity of the damage functions if follows that:  ( ) ( )
e I e o
j N j N
j N j N
D D ω ω
∈ ∈
> ∑ ∑ . Using 













   
Hence, the equilibrium permit price would be higher with identity considerations than 
without. Given that the equilibrium price function is decreasing in the global permit 
allocation,  this  would  imply 
I o
N N ω ω <   which  contradicts  the  initial  assumption. 
Therefore, it must be that ω ω ≤
I o
N N . 
As we have just shown that the equilibrium price of permits will be higher in case of 
identity considerations, it follows that every country’s representative firm will emit 
less:  ( ) ( )
e I I o e o I o
i i i i i i B E B E E E ρ ρ = > = ⇒ <   due  to  concavity  of  the  benefit 
functions. 
Q.E.D. 
Above we have compared the identity costs from permit trading to transaction costs. 
Note, however, that the identity function in (19) does not increase costs of permit 
trading. If trade reduces the distance between actual emissions and ideal emissions, 
the country may also benefit in identity terms from trade. 
3.2.2.3 Both identity effects taken together 
We are now able to combine the results of the previous sections on the identity effects 
separately. Taken together, the full identity function can be written as follows: 
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, , ;
[ , ; ( )]
i i i i i i
i i i i
i i
F E E e if E
I e e
E e otherwise
δ ω ρ β β γ ρ β β β ω ρ β
ω β
γ ρ β β β
   − − − − − ≠    = 
− −  
ω ω ω
ω
  (21) 
Note that the new identity function describes an internal conflict; we can have 
*
i i e e = , 
but still  i i e ω ≠ . | 
 
The results above will enable us to characterize the conditions under which global 
emissions might evolve into the direction of first-best Pareto efficient emissions.  
Proposition 8: 
If countries are reluctant to trade permits and if they care about the ideal, then the 
endogenous permit allocation equilibrium is shifted in the direction of the efficient 
solution if, either: 






  − >   ∑  holds, or, 
•  the  identity  effect  regarding  the  ideal  is  valued  sufficiently  strongly  to 
compensate the identity effect regarding reluctance to trade. 
Proof: The proof is trivial by combining Propositions 4 and 7. 
This result describes the conditions under which identity considerations might foster 
global emission reduction and hence, reduce the gap between the endogenous permit 
trading equilibrium and the Pareto efficient first-best level of emissions. At first sight, 
one might think it is obvious that identity considerations would lead to lower global 
emissions. However, Proposition 8 shows that it depends crucially on both the form of 
the  identity  function  and  the  balance  of  power  between  permit  importers  and 
exporters.  
What does this analysis so far learn us when we try to apply it to the international 
climate negotiations that should lead to a follow-up agreement for the post-Kyoto 
period after 2012? As we have argued above, most simulation models predict that 
permit exporters are predominantly countries with relatively flat marginal emission 






  −   ∑  is likely to be negative. 
From  Proposition 8,  we  can  therefore  conclude  that  the  overall  emission  level 
resulting from the international climate negotiations outcome will be closer to the 
first-best level of emissions only if there is a relatively strong identity effect based on 
the gap between actual and ideal emissions levels. If this identity effect is weak, the 
gap between the negotiated permit allocation and first-best emissions levels will be 
higher  than  in  a  scenario  where  identity  considerations  would  not  play  a  role  in 
governments’ decision making process.  
Another way of interpreting our result is as follows. Proposition 8 (and 4) can be 
interpreted as arguments to say that one should be careful with imposing constraints 
on global permit trading. Although ethically motivated, these constraints on permit 
trade might lead to an adverse effect in the sense that they lead to higher global 
emissions if permits allocations are the result of a non-cooperative negotiation process 
between  sovereign  countries.  Hence,  this  can  be  seen  as  a  warning  against  those   20 
arguing  for  limiting  access  to  international  flexibility  mechanisms  in  international 
climate policy. They might end up worse in environmental terms, in spite of their 
ethical motivation.  
 
4. The decision to involve in permit trading 
From  equation (12),  we  know  that  without  trading,  governments  would  choose 
emissions ceilings equal to  ˆi e  such that:  
  ( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ ;
e e
i i i N i B e D e I β = −∆   (22) 
Marginal  benefits  from  a  small  emissions’  increase  should  equal  the  country’s 
individual marginal damage of this increase in addition to the change in identity. As 
there is now trade, the effect on identity only exists because of a divergence from the 
ideal  level,  i.e., 
* ˆ 2 [ ] i i i I e e γ ∆ = − − .  Note  that (22)  assumes  that  all  countries  have 
chosen not to trade, we are in a non-trade regime. We denote this as the business-as-
usual (BAU) case. 
A trading regime is preferred over a non-trade regime if and only if the welfare in the 
trading regime is higher than the welfare with no trade, i.e.: 
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ω ω   (23) 
This condition implies an upper bound on the fixed identity term: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 * 2 * 2
ˆ ˆ ; ; ; ; ; ;
ˆ , ; ( , ; ( )) ( ( ))
i i i i i i i i i i i N
i i i i i i i
F B E B e E D D e
E E e e e
ρ β β β ρ β ω ρ β β ω ω
δ ω ρ β β γ ρ β β β γ β φ β
−   ≤ − + − − + +  
  − − − − + − ≡  
ω ω ω
ω ω
  (24) 
Thus, if Fi , the identity cost of moving to a trading regime, is larger than  ( ) i φ β , 
which is the benefit from a trading regime, country i prefers a regime with no trade. 
In Proposition 1, we showed that overall emissions with trade can be higher or lower 
than overall emissions without trade if there  are no identity considerations. Helm 
(2003), Proposition 4, also shows that a trading regime may be welfare improving 
even if emissions are higher. Note that the identity considerations introduced by the 
fixed term and by δ > 0 in our paper represent costs of trading and thus lower welfare 
in the trading system compared to when identity considerations are not present.
16 
Based on this, we can derive the following result: 
                                                 
16 If 0 γ > , we cannot rule out the possibility that identity costs will be less with trading. As noted 
above and as seen from equation (24), if  ˆ i i e e <  the identity from deviating from the ideal will 
improve from trading.    21 
Proposition  9:  
Without identity considerations overall emissions may be lower and welfare may be 
higher in the trading situation than without trade. Thus if identity considerations are 
included that induces a cost to trading, countries may prefer no trade and higher 
emissions to a system with trade and lower emissions. However, if overall emissions 
as well as welfare are higher with trade, including identity considerations may induce 
a system with no trade and lower overall emissions. 
Proof: See the text above as well as proof for Proposition 4 in Helm (2003). 
4.1 The effects of technological improvements 
As noted in the introduction as well as in Bénabou and Tirole (2007), p. 20, there 
seems to be a changed attitude towards pollution permits the last few years. A larger 
interest in pollution permit trade may be due to a change in the norm so that it is more 
acceptable than before to trade permits, but there may also be another explanation; the 
transactions may still be repugnant so that the norm is constant, but the benefits from 
trade may be higher than before. 
Comparing the economy today and a few years ago, one relevant difference is the 
change in mitigation technology. Technology improves over time, in such a way that 
mitigation  becomes  cheaper.  Based  on  this,  we  consider  how  an  exogenous 
technological change may alter the decisions of a country on whether to prefer a trade 
regime  to  a  non-trade  regime.  I.e.,  we  will  study  how  a  shift  in  the  technology 
parameter β will alter the benefits from a trade regime represented by ( ) i φ β . 
Assume  first  that  γ  =  0,  so  that  only  the  norm  on  permit  trading  matters.  The 
derivative of the RHS of (24) with respect to β  is given by: 
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  (25) 
Or, using the firms’ trading FOC, i.e., 
e
i B ρ = : 
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i i i i i
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  (26) 
And  using  the  Nash  equilibrium  FOC  in  the  no-trade  situation  for  γ  =  0,  i.e., 
( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ
e e
i i i i i B e D e e− = + , and substituting ρ for 
e
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  + − + −  
  − − − +  
− + ￿
  (27) 
Assume now that 0
e e
i i i i D D e
β β ω − − − + ≈ ￿ , i.e., the effects on damage of a marginal change 
in allowance choice and BAU emissions in other countries due to an increase in the 
technology parameter are about the same
17, or that the total effect is small which may 
be a reasonable assumption. This leaves four different effects on the benefits from 
trade: 
•  ￿
i i B B
β β − : The first term reflects that abatement has become cheaper as a result 
of technological change. We know that ￿ 0 i i B B C
β β β − = − > , see Appendix 1. 
Thus, the benefit in deviating from the BAU equilibrium has increased. This 
holds for both potential buyers and sellers. 
•  [ ] i i E
β ρ ω − : The second term reflects the effects of a change in price. As 
β ρ <  0,  this  effect  is  positive  for  buyers,  [ ] i i E ω −   <  0,  and  negative  for 
sellers, [ ] i i E ω −  > 0. 
• 
e e
i i i B D
β ω   −  : The third term reflects the effects of a change in the initial 
allocation. As seen, this is dependent on the gap between marginal benefit and 
marginal damage. As seen from Proposition 3, this gap is positive (
e e
i i B D > ) 
for a permit seller and negative for a permit buyer (
e e
i i B D < ). 
•  [ ] 2 ( ) i i i i i E E E
β ρ β β δ ω ω ρ   − − − +  :  The  final  term  reflects  the  impact  on 
identity of a  change in  technological change. This effect is ambiguous for 
sellers and buyers as discussed below. 
Assume first that 0 i
β ω < , i.e., the country may want to decrease its initial emission 
allocation if there is a positive change in technology. This may seem as a reasonable 
assumption as countries will be less dependent of fossil fuels. Below we will also take 
a look at other possibilities.
18 
Consider first the case where only the fixed identity term matters (δ = 0), i.e., there 
are no identity effects from the volume of trade. In this case we see that the first three 
effects  are  positive  for  a  potential  buyer,  while  the  last  one  is  zero.  Thus,  a 
technological change will make it more beneficial to trade and the potential buyers 
may be willing to not follow the norm. 
                                                 
17 This assumes that the signs of  i
β ω− and  i e
β
− ￿  are equal. It proves that these derivatives are difficult to 
sign without specific functional forms. See Appendix 2 for the derivation of  i e
β
− ￿  and Appendix 3 for 
the derivation of  i
β ω− . 
18 The sign of  i
β ω is ambiguous without choosing specific functional forms, see Appendix 3.   23 
For potential sellers, the result is less clear. As for buyers, sellers will also benefit 
from cheaper abatement (the first term), but the second and the third term is not 
favourable for potential sellers. Thus, the incentive to move to a permit trading regime 
may be less or higher. This leads us to the following result:  
Proposition 10:  
If  0 i
β ω <  and γ = 0 and δ = 0, potential buyers will have a higher incentive to involve 
in trade if there is a technological change, even if there is a norm against permit 
trading. For potential sellers, the incentives are ambiguous, but we cannot rule out 
the case where potential sellers also will have a higher incentive in trading with 
permits if there is a technological change. 
Proof: See text above. 
Assume now that δ > 0 such that identity is falling in the volume of trade. If there is a 
technological change, the effect on identity is as follows: 
  [ ] 2 ( ) i i i i i i I E E E
β β ρ β β δ ω ω ρ   = − − − +    (28) 
For  a  potential  seller  [ ] i i E ω −   >  0,  and  identity  will  only  increase  if 
( ) i i i E E
β ρ β β ω ρ   − +  < 0, i.e., if emissions increases more than initial allocations for a 
change in technology. If  0 i
β ω < , this means that the initial allocation of permits has 
to fall more than the actual emissions. Note that the effect of technological change on 
emissions is ambiguous as the first part in the parenthesis is positive while the second 
is negative. For a potential buyer the conclusion is the other way around. This leads to 
the following result: 
Proposition 11:  
If  δ  >  0  and    γ  =  0,  the  identity  from  the  volume  of  trade  is  affected  by  an 
improvement  in  technology.  This  may  reduce  the  incentive  to  trade  permits  for a 
technological change. However, there is also a possibility that this identity effect 
increases the incentives to trade permits. 
Proof: See text above. 
The  last  part  of  this  result  is  interesting.  If  a  country  considers  transactions  in 
pollution permits as repugnant, but in addition prefers a small volume of trade to a 
high volume if it chooses to trade, this last identity effect may actually make the 
country more willing to start trading if there is a technological change. The reason is 
that the volume of trade will be lower with the new technology, which will reduce the 
identity loss from trade. 
The case where identity matters only for buyers (asymmetric identity function), will 
not change the results above. Buyers can be willing to trade permits if the volume of 
trade will be reduced with the new technology. 
Consider now the full identity function from (21), i.e. the case where δ > 0 and γ > 0, 
so that there is also a norm to do abatement at home. The identity effects then become   24 
[ ] ￿ * * * * 2 ( ) 2 ( ) i i i i i i i i i i i i i i I E E E e e e E e E E e
β β ρ β β β ρ β β β δ ω ω ρ γ ρ         = − − − + − − + − + −        
  (29) 
The second term in this equation is the effect from γ > 0. In general this effect is 
ambiguous too, which means that the conclusion in Proposition 8 still holds. The 
reason for this is that we cannot say in general whether a technology change moves 
the actual emissions closer or further away from the ideal emissions. 
Proposition 12: 
If identity depends on both from the volume of trade (δ > 0) and on the distance 
between actual and ideal emissions (γ > 0), the identity is affected by an improvement 
in technology. This may reduce the incentive to trade permits for a technological 
change. However, there is also a possibility that this identity effect increases the 
incentives to trade permits. 
Proof: See text above. 
So far we have considered the case where  0 i
β ω < . However, as seen from Appendix 
3, we cannot rule out the other possibilities. If  0 i
β ω =  this would leave out the third 
effect on  ( ) i φ β , but would still leave the effect on identity uncertain. If  0 i
β ω > , this 
would  make  the  incentive  for  a  potential  buyer  more  uncertain.  Still  there  is  an 
identity effect as found in Propositions 11 and 12. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we analysed how identity considerations affect an endogenous pollution 
permit trading equilibrium, in which governments choose in a non-cooperative way 
the  overall  environmental  objective  and  regional  permit  allocations.  With  identity 
considerations we mean two things. First, countries may feel reluctant to trade permits 
because they feel it is a way to escape ones moral responsibility or because of the 
assumed negative consequences the trade may have in developing countries. Hence, 
both consequentialist and procedural ethics arguments are used to justify limits on 
access to flexible mechanisms like CDM in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol or 
European Emission Trading Scheme  for instance. Once  governments  have  chosen 
permit  allocations,  firms  are  assumed  to  trade  these  permits  on  an  international 
competitive permit market without taking into account moral restraints. 
Our main conclusions are the following. Given an internationally negotiated permit 
trading  system,  identity  considerations  may  increase  or  reduce  global  emissions 
depending  on  the  precise  formulation  of  the  identity.  We  considered  two  main 
formulations  of  identity.  The  first  one  captures  the  idea  that  countries  might  be 
reluctant to trade. For that formulation we showed that if identity is asymmetric, i.e., 
if only permit permit importers feel reluctant to buy, global emissions will be higher 
than  in  an  endogenous  permit  trading  equilibrium  without  moral  motivation.  The 
reason is that permit importers over allocate their domestic firms in order to reap 
strategic permit trade gains (because of lower global permit prices) and to reduce the 
amount of permits they have to import and hence their loss of identity. However, for 
symmetric identity functions, the opposite effect may take place and global emissions   25 
might be lower than compared to the case without moral concerns. For symmetric 
identity considerations, the overall effect of identity on global emissions is shown to 
depend on the balance of power (more precisely the slope of their marginal abatement 
cost  functions)  between  permit  importers  and  exporters.  Using  these  results,  we 
conjecture  that  global  emissions  are  likely  to  increase  instead  of  decrease  when 
national governments are reluctant to trade permits.  
The second formulation of identity takes into account the gap between actual and 
ideal emission levels. As ideal, we consider the first-best Pareto efficient emission 
allocation  (without  identity  considerations).  We  show  that  global  emissions  will 
always be lower with this type of identity function. The central proposition of this 
paper combines both identity formulations and formulates conditions under which 
global emissions will go down or up if identity considerations are taken into account. 
In general, the result can be interpreted as a warning against imposing limits on access 
to  flexible  instruments  and  permit  imports.  Even  though  these  limits  (or 
supplementarity  requirements  as  they  are  often  called  in  the  Kyoto  context)  are 
morally motivated, they might have adverse effects because they lead to higher global 
emissions. 
Finally, we explored the impact of technological change (an exogenous reduction in 
emission reduction costs) on the endogenous permit market equilibrium. We were 
able to show that under plausible assumptions, a technological change in mitigation 
technologies  may  have  made  it  more  attractive  for  countries  to  engage  in  permit 
trading.  
We see the following ways to improve upon our results. First, different formulations 
of  the  identity  function  are  possible  than  the  ones  we  considered  in  this  paper. 
Secondly,  it  is  a  tempting,  but  surely  very  difficult,  task  to  try  to  relate  the  first 
practical  experiences  with  international  emission  allocations  by  governments  (the 
allocation of emission reduction burdens in the 1997 Kyoto agreement or the the 
National Allocation Plans NAPs under the EU Emission Trading System ETS ) to our 
theoretical results. In particular, it would be interesting to try to disentangle moral 
motivations  for  imposing  limits  on  access  to  permit  trading  from  strategic  price 
manipulation  motives.  Our  theoretical  results  might  provide  some  reference 
framework to formulate empirical tests with simulations models of permit trading 
markets for distinguishing between both motivations.  
   26 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: The benefit function 
A general abatement cost function frequently used in the literature is: 
  ( ) ; C a β    
With a the level of emission abatement, i.e.  ˆ a e e = − . Emission reduction is defined 
as  the  difference  between  business-as-usual  emissions  ˆ e  and  actual  emissions  e. 
Technology is represented by a parameter  β  where higher  β  means a better or more 
efficient technology.  
It  is  usually  assumed  that  this  function  has  the  following  properties  (see,  e.g., 
Golombek and Hoel, 2005): 
 
2 2
2 0; 0; 0; 0
a aa a C C C C




∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
≡ > ≡ > ≡ < ≡ <
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
   
This means that costs are falling in technology ( 0 C
β < ) and that the benefit from 
increasing emissions falls in technology ( 0
a C
β < ). 
Emission  abatement  costs  are  defined  as  the  difference  in  benefits  between  the 
business-as-usual and actual emission level: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ ; ; ; ; C a C e e B e B e β β β β = − = −    
such that 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆ ; ; ; B e B e C a β β β = −    








































   
and 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆ ; ; ; B e B e C a
β β β β β β = −    
thus, 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆ ; ; ; 0 B e B e C a
β β β β β β − = − >    
The sign of  ( ) ; B e
β β  should equal  ( ) ˆ; B e
β β . As the difference between the two 
terms is positive, the sign could be both positive and negative. However, as  0
e B
β < ,   29 
the benefit function should be flatter for a change in technology for all values of e. 
This would not be the case if  0 B
β > . Thus we find that:  0 B
β < . 
 
 
Appendix 2: The effects on BAU emissions due to a 
technological change 
Without trading, governments set emissions ceilings such that  
 
( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ
e e
i i i i i B e D e e− = +                  (1) 
( ) ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ
e e
i i i i i B e D e e − − − − = +                           (2) 
 












β − − +
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                 (4) 
 
Note that the denominator is positive in both equations, while the nominator depends 
on the sign of emission response from the other country. 
 
Inserting from (4) in (3) gives: 
 
ˆ
ee ee ee e
ee ee e i i i i
i i i i ee ee ee ee
i i i i
D D D B
e B D B
B D B D
β
β β − −
− − − −
 
− − = − +   − −  
          (5) 
 
Similary, we find 
 
ˆ
ee ee ee e
ee ee e i i i i
i i i i ee ee ee ee
i i i i
D D D B
e B D B
B D B D
β
β β − −
− − − −
 
− − = − +   − −  
          (6) 
 
The terms on the right hand side of (5) and (6) are positive. However, the sign of the 
parenthesis on left hand side is ambiguous. 
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Appendix 3: The effects on the initial allowances due to a 
technological change 
To find the effect on the initial emission allowance, ω, of a technological change, β, 
we do comparative statics of expression (10) using the identity function in (16): 
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(7) 
This can be written:   
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] { }
2 1 1 2
2 1 2
−  
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 
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p ee ee p p pp p i
i i i i i i i i i i i i
i
p pp p p
i i i i i i i i i i
d
E E D D E E E E E d
d
E E E E E E E E d
ωω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ω ωω
ωβ ω β β β ω ω β ω β ωβ
ω
ρ ω ρ ρ ρ ρ δ ρ ρ δ ω ρ ρ ρ ω
ω
ρ ω ρ ρ δ ρ δ ω ρ ρ ρ ρ β
  (8) 
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To be able to solve this, we need to find 
ωω ρ , 
i ωβ ρ and 
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  (10) 
Signing these expressions requires signing the second derivatives of the emission 
functions. Thus, we cannot generally say anything of the sign of   i
β ω . This may 
require using specific functional forms. 
 